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I. LAW AND CULTURE
In order to establish a solid legal system, China is now attempting to
enact various codes and reform the judiciary at a feverish pitch. It has been
less than 30 years since China reinstated the Faculty of Law at Beijing
University at the end of the Cultural Revolution and began promulgating
rules to facilitate a market economy, first addressing designated economic
foreign settlements and then gradually expanding the regime to the whole
state. Finally, at the 1997 Party Convention, the Chinese government officially affirmed the development of a constitutional state governed by law.'
Nevertheless, numerous problems still remain. Among businesses
advancing into China, faith in Chinese law is low, and many complain
that their rights are inadequately enforced in courts.! While the major fault
lies in substantive laws that require further enactments and refinements,
difficulties also result from the opaqueness of the government rulemaking
process and the way in which laws are discretionarily interpreted by
government officials.3 In addition, the independence of the judiciary is
weak, and local courts in particular allegedly conduct their processes in a
blatantly protectionist way to serve local governments, which have
authority over judicial personnel issues and budgets.4 Demands regarding
*

Professor of Law, Kyoto University. LL.B., Tokyo University; Ph.D. in Sociology,
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Masayuki Kobayashi, Daijurokukai totaikai no shihoseisaku-hochikokkakensetsu
1.
no ayumi [Justice System Policies of the 16th Party Convention-Towards Establishinga Constitutional State], in AJIA SHOKOKU NO SHIHOKAIKAKU

[JusTICE SYSTEM REFORM IN ASIAN

NATIONS] 57 (Masayuki Kobayashi & Shinya Imaizumi eds., 2002).
A majority of Japanese businesses present in China, 54.5%, listed "problems with
2.
the taxation and legal system" as a "difficulty encountered in doing business in China." MINISTRY OF ECON., TRADE, AND INDUS., TsUSHO HAKUSHO 2001 [2OOI WHITE PAPER ON INT'L
TRADE] 33 (2001).
3.
Peter H. Come, Creation and Application of Law in the PRC, 50 AM. J. COMP. L.
369 (2002).
4.
See Ken Suzuki, Chugoku ni okeru shijoka ni yoru shiho no sekishutsu [The Precipitation of the Judiciary Owing to the Marketization of China], in SHIJOKEIZAIKA NO
HOSHAKAIGAKU [THE LEGAL SOCIOLOGY OF ECONOMIC MARKETIZATION]

239

(Akio Komo-

rita ed., 2001); Masayuki Kobayashi, Chugoku no shiho kaikaku-inminhoin kaikaku no
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these issues have been communicated to the Chinese government
through diplomatic channels and at meetings of international trade
organizations, prompting the government to promise improvements. This
is the true meaning of globalization's impact on domestic laws.
As China makes advances in the development of law, contradictions
within the socialist political system have begun to surface The government's discretionary interpretation of laws and the absence of judicial
independence, which cause dissatisfaction amongst foreign enterprises,
emanate from the political system. These problems are not simply the
result of lapses by governments or courts, however, but are deeply rooted
in socialist governance. Law reforms to meet business concerns necessarily contradict the way the Chinese government oversees the state's
affairs. Concerning property law reform, for example, a significant debate has recently arisen over creating laws based purely on civil property
law principles that exclude political interference. Public protests against
abusive exercises of power have also increased, especially in response to
the Chinese government's use of eminent domain, in which it forcefully
takes farm lands for economic development without granting sufficient
compensation. It seems difficult to confine the development of laws to
the economic domain and separate human rights and government structures from the agenda of law reform.6
Viewed in the light of legal evolution, this is the fascinating process
of the establishment of law, a parallel development of the protection of
private rights and the guarantee of human rights. Whether it is a peculiar
trend in modern neoliberalism or a more fundamental aspect of law, the
kind of popular discourse discussed above thus constitutes civil society
in China.The development of law has the functionality to transform the
genjo to kadai [China's Justice System Reforms-The People's Court: The Present State and
Issues], in CHUGOKU SHIDOBU NO SENSHUTSU [THE LAUNCH OF CHINESE LEADERSHIP] 37
(Yasuo Onishi ed., 2003).
5.
See Nobuyuki Tanaka Jinmin chotei to hochishugi no sokoku [The Conflict Between
People's Mediation and Governance of Law], in 1 GENDAI CHUGOKU [MODERN CHINA] 279
(Iwanami Koza ed., 1989) (depicting policy confusion and dilemmas due to the inconsistencies between socialism and the rule of law at the commencement of economic reforms).
6.
A related issue is how extensively to address systemic political problems when
advocating the development of law. See Masanori Aikyo, Hoseibishienno jissai to riron [The
Theory and Practiceof Supporting Development of Law], 62 HIKAKU HOGAKU [CoMP. LEGAL
STUD.] 108-19 (2000); see also KAZUO FURUTA, KAIHATSU ENJO TO MINSHU SHUGI [DEVELOPMENTAL ASSISTANCE AND DEMOCRATIZATION] 153 (1998). See also Carol V. Rose, The
"New" Law and Development Movement in the Post-Cold War Era:A Vietnam Case Study, 32
L. & Soc'y REV. 93 (1998) (analyzing complications resulting from the fact that Vietnam is
now receiving support for development of law from the United States, which it fought in order
to establish socialism, and that the United States explicitly seeks, in its diplomatic policy, the
establishment of a liberal democratic system for supporting developing states).
7.
See Fan Yun Tao, Chuo-chiho kankei o meguru ho to seiji [The Law and Politics
regardingthe Relationship between the Central and Local Governments], in SHINSO NO CHU-
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people's consciousness and reconstruct their relationships with the state
in a diffuse manner.
The social changes brought about by the introduction of law are a
worthy subject of legal sociology, which pursues the connection between
law and society, and modem China provides fascinating research material in this regard. Setting aside, however, the interesting details of an
immense society with distinct characteristics, if I ask myself, as a Japanese researcher who does not specialize in Chinese law, what will be
learned from the Chinese experience, I find it difficult to extract general
meanings from China's evolution of law, at least as it is argued now. Japan already has laws in place suited to a market economy, as well asdespite some criticism-an independent judiciary and governance by
law. If we learn from the experiences of other states, the usual course for
us in Japan is to condemn our own system after looking to Europe and
United States and measuring the gaps between their systems and ours.
This is the same with Chinese scholars. When they enact laws and reform their legal institutions, they look to Europe and the United Statesand incidentally to Japan as well. If we try to find fresh insights and new
developments in law in China, we will thus be disappointed. But is this
the only way for non-Western societies like Japan or China to develop
law? Even as foreign laws are assimilated, can there not be an evolutionary pattern in which they are absorbed and then manifested into laws
with a distinct identity?
This Article tries to answer this question, finding clues in the parallel
processes of Chinese legal development and Japanese legal reform. While
the development of law presently underway in China resembles Japan's
reception of German laws in the Meiji period-in the sense of it being
"from scratch"-Japan, which concluded this reception a century ago, is
undertaking major law reforms in the present as well. Starting with deregulation and administrative reform, and now extending to justice system
reform, Japan is attempting to transform its image as a "society where the
law is used sparingly." It goes without saying that the backdrop to this
fresh start is the globalized market.8 Although their developmental stages

158 (Satoshi Amako & Masaharu Ishida
eds., 2000) for the assertion that a civic revolution accompanying the rule of law is quietly in
progress in the background of the socialist system.
Beyond general causes such as increases in productivity and innovations in infor8.
mation technology, factors behind the establishment of a global market include the consistent
attempts to promote free trade by developed capitalist states since World War H, the support
given to the structural reform of developing states by the World Bank and Japan's Official
Development Assistance (ODA), and the ascendancy of Asian states at the end of the Cold
War. Kunikazu Karaki, Sekai keizai-gurobarizeshon to Ajia keizai [The World EconomyGlobalizationand the Asian Economy], in GENDAI AJIA NO TOCHI TO KYOSEI [GOVERNANCE
GOKU SHAKAI [THE DEPTHS OF CHINESE SOCIETY]
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and practical issues differ, both China and Japan are carrying out marketoriented law reforms with the aim of excelling as players in the massive
global market. If we view this as evolution of law, we can characterize it
as the transfer of law amidst competition between state systems. 9 Just as
the relative merits of corporate structures are connected to their business
profitability, a superior legal system will enable societies to display superior performance in the form of economic growth. The global market
not only intensifies competition between these societal systems, but it
also encourages the international distribution of system information,
markedly raising system visibility. Under these conditions, superior law
will not result from the wholesale reception of a particular legal system
but from cross-border transfers of fragments of legal norms, procedures,
and institutions of different systems and the combination of these into a
single law-or the adding of their parts to replace an existing law. To
borrow a term favored by modem anthropology, the emergence of "creoles," or the mixture of different species, is occurring in the legal world.
Comparative law scholars today note that due to the mutual permeation
and fusion of laws, the concept of "legal families" is becoming difficult
to accept. This stateless circulation of legal norms is yet another feature
of globalism.'°
Of course, even if law is treated as transplantable phenomena cut off
from culture and tradition, to be evaluated only by its performance,
states will not attain this "culture-free law" in perfect form. Three models predict how culture will continue to affect the evolution of law.
First, and most obviously, culture may deter the reception of law.
Despite being transplanted, law does not take root unless a society receives its inherent logic and ideals. Culture, in this model, is labeled as
an idiosyncratic, indigenous aspect of the receiving society to be pitted
against the law, which is posited as a universal and hence cultureless
truth, applicable to all societies. The reception of law requires overcoming
indigenous culture and enlightening the people with the spirit of the law.
In this vein of culture-law dichotomy, when the reception of law to such
depth is problematic and its costs insurmountable, selective importation
can compromise the contents of the law. Also pertinent here is the "path
dependency" model in economics, which explains system evolution by
AND SYMBIOSIS IN MODERN ASIA] 75 (Kunikazu Karaki et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter

Gov-

ERNANCE AND SYMBIOSIS].
9.
"With economic globalization, international competition among nations for institutional reforms has been strengthened." MINISTRY OF INT'L TRADE AND INDUS., TsUSHO
HAKUSHO 2000 [2o00 WHITE PAPER ON INT'L TRADE] 182 (2000).
10.
See the keynote report by Michiatsu Kaino at an academic symposium on contemporary issues in comparative law. Michiatsu Kaino, Hoseibi shien to hikaku hogaku no kadai
[Supporting Development of law and Issues in Comparative Law], 62 HIKAKUHO KENKYU
[CoMP. L.] 61 (2000).
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assuming that a system evolves not necessarily to achieve the maximum
efficiency possible but to take the restricted path defined by prior conditions. In the case at hand, a society's particular culture is an initial
condition for system evolution and is therefore expected to regulate subsequent development.
At the opposite pole is the second model, which contradicts the negative depiction of culture set against law in the first model, instead seeing
culture as a positive value that also subsumes law. An extreme, and in that
sense, somewhat quixotic argument goes this way: East Asia has a Confucian tradition and has developed "relational rules" that bring harmony and
order to society. These rules not only regulate society independently of
law but are reflected in the laws constructed upon them." Some dare to
argue for the possibility of "a common Asian law" built on this tradition,2
especially in light of the recent formation of regional economic blocs.'
Moreover, while governments raise "Asian values" in response to human
rights diplomacy in international politics, academics point out that
within universal human rights concepts there are differences between
positions that push strongly for civil liberties and those that emphasize
equality and social rights. Some claim that loose cultural blocs are discernible from these differences.' 3 In the background to this debate lies
Asian self-confidence from attaining economic growth and its sense of
rivalry with the West. There is also an undercurrent of methodological
reflection upon the nature of anthropological scholarship, which purports
to objectively describe tribal societies. Being conscious of their own
enlightened gaze, which was at the core of colonial powers viewing colonial subjects in light of the West's historical universality, 4 researchers

11.
See, e.g., Chongko Choi, Foundationsof Law and Justice in East Asia, 18 COMe. L.
1(2001).

12.

See NOBUYUKI YASUDA, TONAN AJIA HO [EAST ASIAN LAW] (2000),

written with

an awareness of searching for commonality. Yasuda's position is that there is an innate sensibility in Asia that Western legal notions are dissimilar; he finds such "Asian-ness" in
"communitarianism" as cultivated in agricultural communities. See Nobuyuki Yasuda, Ajiateki
narumono ni tsuite-Ajia no jinken, kenrigainen rikai no zentei toshite [On Asian-ness: The
Prerequisitefor Understanding Human Rights and Rights Concepts in Asia], 52 HOKUDAi
HOGAKU [HOKKAIDO U. L.J.] 605 (2001). See also Ken Suzuki's legal family analysis on
China, Ken Suzuki, Shiron-HigashiAjiahokei no seiritsu kanosei, [Note-The Possibility of
Establishing an East Asian Legal System], 53 HOKUDAI HOGAKU [HOKKAIDO U. L.J.] 900
(2002).
13.

YASUAKI ONUMA,

JINKEN, KOKKA, BUNMEI [HUMAN RIGHTS, THE STATE, AND

CULTURE] (1998).
14.
See Hideo Kubo, Kindaiho no furontia ni okeru bunkateki tasha ni tsuite no chiposuto koroniaru hihan no hoshakaigaku [Power/Knowledge of "Cultural Others" on the
Frontierof Modern Law-The Legal Sociology of Post Colonial Criticism] (pts. 1 & 2), 153
HOGAKU RONSO [KYOTO L. REV.] No. 4, 92 (2003), 153 HOGAKU RONSO [KYOTO L. REv.]
No. 5, 101 (2003), for a critical appraisal of the continuity in Japan's legal sociology between
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began to adopt the interpretative method of understanding a subject from
within its culture.
This method, interacting with various other modem social theories,
has been a major current in academia since World War II, and efforts are
being made in research on Chinese legal history to understand China's
legal order not as lacking in Western legal concepts but as being an alternative way of constructing order. Culture is therefore not only
incorporated into the legal order but also is used as an interpretive
framework by the people themselves to make that order comprehensible.'5 Geertz, an anthropologist, asserts that this culture-based law is a
universal feature of law, calling it "local knowledge."'' 6 Considering,
however, that modem law is situated within a global competition toward
efficient systems, it departs from reality to take this "culture-laden law"
as firmly bound by tradition. In fact, a society's tradition has a kaleidoscopic composition that allows for divergent descriptions depending on
one's point of view.'7 Culture is also incessantly reimagined and recreated by the people within a changing society. Thus, some argue, the
second model, by not seeing this fluidity and negotiability, falls into the
same essentialist notion of culture as the first model.' 8
With this criticism in mind, we can consider a third model for exploring the way in which culture affects law. This model first evaluates
imported laws on their performance, so that only the fittest survive, and
then looks into alternative laws constructed with local culture as their
pre-War surveys on agricultural villages in North China in the service of colonial rule and
post-War studies of indigenous culture for the sake of enlightenment for modernization.
15.
Hiroaki Terada, Kindaiho chitsujo to Shindai minjiho chitsujo [Modern Legal Order
and Qing Civil Legal Order], in KINDAIHO NO SAITEIRITSU [THE REORIENTATION OF MODERN
LAW] 85 (Mitsuki Ishii et al. eds., 2001). See in particular his view of history: "[Tlhese 500
years in both the West and in China was a period of coping with market-like competitions
between large numbers of individuals, and with such . . factors being slightly different, they
are taking a somewhat different trajectory." Id. at 106.
16.
See CLIFFORD
ANTHROPOLOGY (1991).

GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE

17.
See Mio Kishimoto, Moraru ekonomi-ron to Chugoku shakai kenkyu [Theory of
Moral Economy and Research on Chinese Society], 792 SHIso [THOUGHT] 213 (1990). She
applied Scott's moral economy theory-which regards the "subsistence and reciprocity
norms" peculiar to Asian peasantry as having emerged from unstable agricultural production-to China's agricultural cooperatives and clarified the debates over understanding
traditional Chinese order, which have occurred on three opposing axes: utilitarianism versus
norm orientation, communitarianism versus self-interest, and universal norms versus situational ethics.
18.
Inoue criticizes the arguments for "Asian values," treating them as rigidly opposed
to Western values-as only turning Orientalism upside down. The substantive arguments
within, however, namely communitarianism and cultural pluralism, should be taken as a challenge to liberalism. See TATSUO INOUE, FUHEN NO SAISEI [RECREATING UNIVERSALITY], ch. 2
(2003). It is necessary to relativize the "universalism" of liberalism before engaging in this
dialogue, even when considering Asian development of law from an Asian perspective.
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sustenance. It shares with the second model the notion that all laws, including imported Western laws and the de facto market-oriented "global
laws" of today, are culture-laden and hence have the character of local
knowledge. Thus, by acknowledging that ostensibly universal law derives from unique and local Western/American culture, it creates the
opportunity for indigenous laws to serve as candidates for modem laws.
Nevertheless, the challenge to seek universal truth, implied in the
first model, continues to constrain the evolution of law. The indigenous
law not only must prove its universality through its efficiency in facilitating market transactions but also through its supremacy in enabling good
society. Although the latter criterion is vague and open to divergent understandings, it is nonetheless important in explaining the law's
evolution. When people invoke the law and reflect upon it, they inadvertently rely on their own culture to discern the good from the bad. This
reflection, reiterated innumerable times, evolves the local law with culture. If a global transmission of ideas and institutional information is
added to this process, there emerges a combination of cultural law and
universal law. This is the process of legal evolution that the third model,
the one to which this Article subscribes, tries to understand.
More concretely, a close examination of legal rationality from the
following three angles will assist in analyzing the evolution of law.
The first angle concerns the exclusivity of rights, which is the notion
that a right has an exclusive boundary of ownership. The socialist system
and traditional customary law in China gave only weak recognition to
this concept, especially prior to China's move toward a market economy
and the introduction of modern law. This socialist/traditional legal approach is generally understood as negative baggage that should be
removed from the law and, consistent with the first model, a distinct culture that should be overcome. This view fails, however, in that it
mistakes legal rhetoric for reality. It is possible to instead discover rationality in the diffusiveness of rights that can also relate to modern law.
The second angle addresses the functionality of extralegal norms.
Law reforms tend to be measured by the efficiency gains they produce, a
process intensified by competition among systems. This trend has, in
recent years, emerged as a focus on informal norms amongst legal and
economic scholars.' 9 One example is the assertion of economic rationalist explanations for local customs spontaneously generated in business
activities. The link between law and such customs, however, is complex
19.
LAW:

Robert C. Ellickson pioneered this trend. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT
How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991). See also Noboru Kawahama, Ho to keizai-

gaku no genkai to kanosei [The Limits and Possibilitiesof Law and Economics], in Ho
RINKAI II [THE CRITICALITY OF LAW II] 209 (Tatsuo Inoue et al. eds., 1999).

NO
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and the subject of a variety of contemporary debates. If this economic
rationalist view is applied to China's development of law, what issues
can it uncover?
The third angle involves the ideological nature of the marketoriented development of law. The foreign enterprises and international
financial institutions leading the global market have until now been major actors in instigating China's development of law. Demands from
business leaders also initiated Japan's justice system reforms. These
leaders want universal and transparent rules of law and an independent
judiciary, which acts as the infrastructure of the global market. Yet in
light of the issues driving current criticism of globalism, including the
environment, social welfare, and the North-South disparity, "universality" may ultimately have political connotations. Thus, the question is,
what role does this critical aspect of globalism play in China's development of law?
II.

THE DIFFUSIVENESS OF RIGHTS

In China, the protection of ownership rights has pivotal importance
in the market economy. It is necessary to motivate individuals to work
and produce in a way that maximizes returns and eliminates the moral
hazard of transferring losses to others.2 0 For this protection to be effectual, however, a one-off policy decision to recognize private ownership is
insufficient. Kawashima, an influential scholar who studied Japanese
legal culture, attested to this in The Theory of PropertyRights Law. Writing in the 1940s, a half century after the reception of laws in Japan,
Kawashima attempted to show that the idealism and absolutism of modem
property rights were not well understood by Japanese jurists, and hence
the protection of property rights was weak and incomplete in Japan.21 We
could read this to mean that the jurists varied property rights in practical
application to allow them to evolve in a Japanese way. This was not Kawashima's position, however. To Kawashima, it was Japanese culture
that prevented the reception of modem law, and he desired the evolution
of law through the subjugation of culture.
For Kawashima, modern society was, more than anything, a society
in which commodity exchange was universalized and modem law ex20.
See MASANOBU KATO, SHOYUKEN NO TANJO [THE BIRTH OF PROPERTY RIGHTS]
(2001), which analyzes, from a world historical perspective, the existence of a system of private property rights as a motivational mechanism in tune with each society's production
system.
21.
See KAWASHIMA TAKEYOSHI, SHOYHaKENHO NO RIRON [THE THEORY OF PROPERTY
RIGHTS LAW] (1949).
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isted as the constitutive rules of this market-type transaction. The reciprocal recognition of rights and the disposal of them by free will must be
universally recognized as prerequisites for the functioning of the market.
The fundamental categories of law, such as legal rights, subjects, and
free will, are the direct expressions of this commodity exchange. In Japan, because rice paddy agriculture within village communities had been
the dominant mode of production, the modem consciousness was slow to
develop. Long after Japan entered its industrial stage, it dragged this
premodern consciousness along, preventing the abstraction of modem
legal rights from society. The fact that Japanese rights are embedded in
the social context gives them an elusive 22character: People "are entitled to
...and yet do not have outright rights."
Regarding property law reform, there are active discussions in China
on state ownership. Although it lies at the core of socialism and the Chinese constitution extols its supremacy, it has a vague and elusive
character with regard to who, in fact, owns what, thereby hindering the
development of a healthy market economy. 3 Ultimately, state and local
governments must exercise "the ownership by all people." When they act
in the economic realm, the public concern, for which the government has
a primary responsibility to care, must of necessity enter and interfere
with the autonomous operation of the market. Therefore, some propose
clearly designating public companies as the main bodies of ownership
rights and strictly limiting their role to managing public assets. Furthermore, with regard to ownership of land by peasants, who are currently in
lease contracts with the villages that actually own the land, some argue
the land should be propertized to guarantee the recovery of invested
capital. On the other hand, there are arguments in favor of continued
oversight by the government to guarantee the livelihoods of peasants and
maintain restrictions on land transfers.
Where this debate will finally settle is uncertain, but both arguments
ultimately posit modem law as a goal incapable of full implementation
due to political realities or social conditions, which make compromises
unavoidable from time to time. In this sense, the debate has a structure
22.

See, on this argument by Kawashima, TAKAO TANASE, KENRI NO GENSETSU

[THE

DISCOURSE OF RIGHTS] ch. 1 (2002).

Koji Omi & Sun Xian Zhong, Chugoku bukkenho rippo ni okeru shoyuken mondai
23.
[The Problem of Ownership Rights in the Enactment of China's Property Law], 77 WASEDA
HOGAKU [WASEDA L.J.] 1 (2002). Liu Hui Ming, Chugoku ni okeru fudosanhosei no mondaiten [Some Issues on Real Estate Law in China], 28 KOKUSAI SHOJI HOMU [J. JAPANESE
INST. INT'L Bus. L.] 89 (2000).
Liang Hui Xing, a drafter of China's Property Law, says it will "establish the system
24.
of usufructuary rights based on the actual situation in China." Liang Hui Xing, Chugoku bukkenho seitei ni kansuru jakkan no mondai [Problems in the Establishment of China's Property
Law], 51 HANDAi HOGAKU [OSAKA U. L.J.] 339 (Xu Hui trans., 2001).
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similar to Kawashima's diagnosis of the state of Japan during his time. If
one assumes, however, that there is an ideal of Western law and the only
problem is its gradual attainment, Chinese law is then simply an example
of a universalistic evolution towards modern Western law. On the other
hand, if one undertakes to discover law inductively from an analysis of
actual rights relationships, perhaps a different evolution of law can be
discovered. In fact, if we look into the actual operations of modem law,
we can discern phenomena that defy its idealistic descriptions.
Regarding the absolutism of property rights, society takes restrictions due to public welfare for granted, with current debates focusing
instead on how much interference should be permitted. This has been
vigorously disputed in Japan with regard to injunctions against public
works. In economic policies, the state often carries out interventions to
rescue failed businesses in order to preserve financial stability and avert
unemployment problems. Under the complex regulation of today's market economy, it is in fact impossible to draw a sharp line between private
activities and public responsibility. Furthermore, the livelihood demands
of the people concerned are easily politicized and linked to public decisions. This reality is in stark contrast to the way modern legal discourse
idealizes and discusses property rights.
Nedelski, an analyst of U.S. constitutional history, raises concerns
over the "boundary metaphor" for rights. 6 She claims that due to the
propertied classes' fear of forcible redistribution of wealth through politics, the U.S. Constitution carefully bounded propertied rights against
outside interference. This also resonates within common culture. For
example, a popular book on child-rearing opines that it is of foremost
importance that parents give children their own possessions to instill in
them a sense of themselves as owners. By giving children their own
rooms, or if that is not possible, perhaps giving them small boxes with a
promise never to look inside them, mothers and fathers will cultivate the
concept of privacy in children and encourage their autonomy. Exclusive
rights over property simultaneously generate autonomous subjects set
apart from others. Nedelski points out the difficulties in this conception
of individual property rights: The exclusivity of rights and separateness
of subjects make it difficult for people to accommodate the unavoidable
25.
Kawamura's research on the criminal justice system is particularly interesting in
this regard. He analyzes the precarious attempts being made in China to realize substantive
justice and care for victims, which people expect and which exists in contemporary Japan,
while guaranteeing the procedural rights of the accused. Arinori Kawamura, Gendai Chugoku
no keiji saiban to dyu-purosesu [Criminal Cases and Due Process in Modem China], 51 KOaE
HOGAKU ZASSHI [KOBE L.J.] 65 (2002).
26.
Jennifer Nedelski, Law, Boundaries,and the Bounded Self, in LAW AND THE ORDER
OF CULTURE

162 (Robert Post ed., 1991).
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conflicts of human relationships and make collective decisions concerning the proper distribution or use of rights."
Comaroff, an anthropologist, likewise narrates the story of an English missionary teaching the importance of individual ownership to local
inhabitants in an African colony.28 The missionary bought a piece of land
for almost nothing, fenced it off, and planted and harvested grain in order to show locals how to break free from poverty through ownership
and labor. The paradox to which Comaroff draws attention, of course, is
that by the time the residents became aware of the significance of the
missionary's practices, almost all the fertile land had been transferred to
white ownership. What is also fascinating about this episode is that, in
the eyes of the white missionary, the practices of the local inhabitants to
expose their nakedness or excrete in public were signs of a lack of selfmanagement in the same way as their ignorance of private land ownership. What can be closed off to others is thus the substance of the "self."
The conception of rights held in the West, as exhibited in these examples, is certainly at odds with the actual functions of rights. As
mentioned above, it is taken for granted that restrictions of private rights
are necessary for the public welfare, with disagreement only over the
appropriate scope of the restrictions. In urban space management, for
example, residents often form self-governing bodies to exercise quasipublic authority. This is a necessary collective effort to enhance habitability, but it gives rise to difficult adjustment problems concerning the
prerogatives of private rights. 9 If one includes minority and environmental issues, the problems become even more complex. The rigid
conception of rights as exclusivity or of subjects as separateness hampers constructive thinking. Although Japan, in an effort to eliminate
excesses in administrative guidance and implement market deregulation,
no longer legally obliges large retail stores to consult with local merchants before opening an outlet, demands for such consultations
continue. When the exercise of property rights affects the vested interests
of others, people customarily expect the rights holders to show concern
for the welfare of those others. 0 The legal doctrine in Japan of the
Id.
27.
John Comaroff, The Discourse of Rights in Colonial South Africa: Subjectivity,
28.
Sovereignty, Modernity, in IDENTITIES, POLITICS, AND RIGHTS 193 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R.
Kearns eds., 1995).
See Sumitaka Harada, Jo [Preface], in NIHON NO TOSHIHO I [JAPAN'S URBAN
29.
PLANNING LAW I] 1 (Sumitaka Harada ed., 2001); Kiyoshi Hasegawa, Kenchiku kyotei to
chiku keikaku [Building Agreements and Zone Planning], in NIHON NO TOSHIHO II [JAAN'S
URBAN PLANNING LAW

II] 425 (Sumitaka Harada ed., 2001).

Young analyzes Japanese administrative guidance, concluding that certain liveli30.
hood interests of citizens, while lacking in a definite legal basis, are acknowledged socially as
de facto rights. Administrative guidance is given in an attempt to protect these interests, and
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"abuse of the right to dismiss," which demands from managers compelling reasons and special considerations before dismissing workers, has
developed from Japanese society's sense of justice. The appropriateness
of such doctrines may change and be contested with the passage of time
and shifting popular sentiments, yet at the core of these doctrines and
social practices restricting rights in consideration of others is a notion of
rights and subjects different from that of the West. While rights and subjects in the West are isolated and mutually constructed in a reflective
manner, at least in the legal and popular discourse, in Japan, both rights
and subjects are unable to close off completely and are seemingly open
to connections with other factors. Although it is not an easy task to give
clear language and status within legal theory to this diffusiveness of
rights, it may be worthwhile to explore such a concept in analyzing the
evolution of law in China.
III. THE

FUNCTIONALITY OF INFORMAL NORMs

In China's legal development, a major issue is guaranteeing the
autonomy of law. The fact that judicial decisions are under Party guidance or subject to political interference from local government directly
conflicts with the rule of law and has been repeatedly criticized. In response to this criticism, various reforms to guarantee the independence
of the judiciary are afoot. In Japan, where direct political interference is
inconceivable, the independence of the judiciary has long been problematic. Yet China is looking to Japan to inform its current effort to bring
professionalism and centralization to its judiciary. How has China absorbed the Japanese experience?
The problem in Japan is thought to be the judicial bureaucracy, in
which judges are under the influence of the General Secretariat of the
Supreme Court, which has authority over personnel affairs. This bureaucracy, however, is a manifestation of a more fundamental policy of
securing the legitimacy of the judiciary by squarely separating it from
politics. In addition, the judiciary has honored Japan's autonomous ordering by refraining from forcing judicial judgments upon society ahead
of a mature consensus. Limiting its jurisdiction in this way and maintaining its integrity from potential attacks and interference from politics and
social forces are really means of attaining the autonomy of law. From
another angle, however, this means that matters that should be regulated
by law may be handed over to politics or societal ordering. True autonthe courts have come to accept such practices. See Michael K. Young, JudicialReview of Administrative Guidance: Governmentally EncouragedConsensualDispute Resolution in Japan,
84 COLUM. L. REV. 923 (1984).
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omy of law, then, is forcefully asserting legal rules and principles in opposition to the will of the majority or to vested interests of society.
Legalism, the idea that it is politically and socially correct to achieve
resolution or regulation by way of law, corresponds with this notion of
autonomy and is implied as a meta-norm in Western law and the ideology of legal professions. The infusion of this idea into society, together
with the development of law, will thus transform the public consciousness and make laws take root in society.
The autonomy of law in this stronger sense brings forth the rule of
law. Over the last 10 years in Japan, many new laws were enacted in areas where legal regulations had been almost nonexistent, including, for
example, protection against child abuse or domestic violence. With new
laws and procedures, legal regulations penetrate into enclaves previously
beyond the law's reach. Yet this aggressive intervention of law into family matters is not effectively implemented without the mobilization other
non-legal professionals like psychologists and social workers. The purposes of intervention are also broader than just the apprehension of
violent offenders or the protection of victims but include the rebuilding
of families, for example."' Self-help groups and NGOs in liaison with
courts and governmental agencies are providing support networks to enable such rebuilding. Law works on top of this layer of society and does
not intrude on its own.
The way in which these autonomous social orderings complement
legal regulations is not unique to families, where radically different orderings from the legal are apparent, but also holds true for economic
transactions. In economics, however, the legal orderings are generally
perceived to be possible and necessary, or even indispensable, for the
construction of a robust market; thus, unless autonomous social orderings display relative superiority over legal regulations, or at least match
them in efficiency, either they cannot exist or exist merely as irrational
traditions that should be overcome by the eventual development of law.
Japanese business practices, which had definite relative supremacy at
one time, are now seen as irrational practices that must be overcome. Reformers have instituted a variety of measures aimed at market discipline,
including the strengthening of director liability and market regulations of
. While such innovations of corporate governance are directly
stock prices 32
See Ayako Nose, Jido gyakutai tojisha no kenri yogo to fukushi sa-bisu no kanri
31.
[The Management of Rights Protection and Welfare Services for Those Involved in Child
Abuse] (pts. 1 & 2), 128 MINPOHO ZASSHI [Civ. L. PERIODICAL] No. 4, at 607 (2003), 128
MINPOHO ZASSHI [Civ. L. PERIODICAL], No. 6, 30 (2003) on advanced efforts in this regard,
particularly in the United States.
At a time when positive views of Japanese business customs predominated, Ram32.
seyer avoided using Japanese culture to explain the scarcity of hostile takeovers in Japan and
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assessed by the market or dictated by reforms of the Commercial Code,
the courts sometimes take initiative in indicating new norms for businesses. For example, in 2000 the Osaka District Court in the Daiwa
Bank case shocked corporate Japan by awarding damages of ¥83 billion
($775 million), an unprecedented amount, in a derivate suit arising from
an employee's fraud.33 Business leaders expressed indignation over the
judges' ignorance of economic reality and their judicial arrogance in imposing self-righteous justice. But setting aside the amount of damages,
the principle of director liability shown in the judgment spread rapidly
and found acceptance as a new norm. This development broke down the
indigenous norms of trade customs, and with new norms emerging, the
primary responsibility of regulation shifted from indigenous ordering to
legal supervision by the state.3
Company monitoring was, until recently, performed mostly in longterm business relationships and main bank systems, with a heavy emphasis on personal trust and reputation. Yet building a vigorous capital
market by strengthening the disclosure system for ordinary investors and
levying strict responsibility on directors requires detailed legal regulations and sufficient enforcement personnel, such as lawyers and
auditors. 3 These requirements are obviously costly, but the transaction
costs are necessary to facilitate capital investments that will produce
maximum returns. The price of reform will thus be offset by improvements in efficiency and a reduction of conversion costs that will decrease
overall production expenses.36
the heavy moral opprobrium with which they are viewed. Instead, he attributed the characteristics to the entrenched vested interests of management, which prevented the market discipline
of corporate directors through stock values from leading to inefficient management. See J.
Mark Ramseyer, Takeovers in Japan: Opportunism, Ideology and Corporate Control, 35
UCLA L. REV. 1 (1987).
33.
See Shinsaku Iwahara, Daiwa ginko daihyo sosho jiken-isshin hanketsu to daihyo
sosho seido kaisei mondai [Daiwa Bank Derivative Suit-The Problems of the First Instance
Judgment and Issues in Revising the Derivative Suit], 1576 SHOJI HOMU [CoM. LEGAL AFF.]
4-14 (2000), 1577 SHOJI HOMU [COM. LEGAL AFF.] 4 (2000). See also Mitsui Kondo, Shoho
kaisei to kabunushi daihyo sosho [Revision of the Commercial Code and Shareholder Derivative Suits] 1191 JURISUTO [JURIST] 2 (2000).
34.
Milhaupt analyzed the breaking down of the norms that sustained Japanese trade
practices and the evolution of a new rule, using corporate governance as a case study. See
Curtis Milhaupt, Creative Norm Destruction: The Evolution of Non-Legal Rules in Japanese
CorporateGovernance, 149 U. PENN. L. REV. 2083 (2001).
35.
See MASAHIKO AOu, KEIZAI SHISUTEMU NO SHINKA TO TAGENSEI [THE EVOLUTION

AND PLURALISM OF ECONOMIC SYSTEMS]

(1995)

for an analysis of why the monitoring

function of Japan's main bank system declined. Aoki assumes path dependency while taking
the position that plurality of equilibrium is possible in the evolution of systems. If read to
mean that culture is a given condition that also evolves as environmental conditions change,
Aoki's model overlaps with the arguments in this Article.
36.
The work that advances this idea is DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE

(1990), which assesses systems from the
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This is a textbook explanation of Japan's recent development of law
within the global market and the efficiency it gained in the interim. But
how should we assess the advantages of Japanese trade practices during
the 1970s and 1980s, when Japan took pride in its overwhelming economic competitiveness? Discussing culture alone to explain these
practices will not provide the answer; it is also necessary to ask why
trade customs were conducive to Japanese competitive advantage. This
inquiry into Japan's legal evolution will impart further insight into
China's development of law.
The following two arguments provide clues to the Japanese experience. The first is Bernstein's argument, based on her observation of the
New York Diamond Exchange, that while laws stipulate rights and provide relief measures for their violation, they can by no means provide
complete protection. The Diamond Exchange has an exclusive membership, conducts transactions through an extremely informal procedure,
and even maintains a system of settling disputes by arbitration. This
makes sense: While full compensation for breach of contract is legally
possible, it is not easy to attain. It is difficult, first of all, to certify losses
in the trade in rough diamonds, where market conditions are unstable
and prices fluctuate dramatically in accordance with the quality of the
processing workmanship. Courts, which take a cautious approach to
losses based on supposition, inevitably deliver inadequate compensation.
Moreover, court cases, which take an average of three years at first instance, cannot cover secondary damages that arise from nonperformance
when a sale has an element of the provision of credit. While these considerations explain why diamond traders avoid courts, such behavior
would not exist absent an alternative mechanism to protect rights. In the
case of diamond trading, a community of Orthodox Jews secures this
mechanism by circulating low-cost, trustworthy information based on
personal credit. This is what is known in economics as the "bond of
reputation, 38 through which opportunistic behavior in the performance
of contracts or resolution of disputes is strongly suppressed to facilitate
continued participation in trading.
perspective of transaction costs and problematizes the relationship with economic outcomes.
See Hiroshi Matsuo, Kaihatsu hogaku to hoseibi shien no rironka [The Law and Development
Study and the Theory of Legal Assistance], 11 YOKOHAMA KOKUSAI KEIZAI HOGAKU [YOKOHAMA L. REV.] 55 (July 2002) (asserting that North's institutional economics form the
theoretical background to development assistance).
37.
Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: ExtralegalContractual Relations
in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (Jan. 1992).
38.
Motoshige Ito, Interfirm Relations and Long-Term Continuous Trading, in BusiNESS ENTERPRISE IN JAPAN: VIEWS OF LEADING JAPANESE ECONOMISTS

109 (Kenichi Imai &

Ryutaro Komiya eds., Ronald Dore & Hugh Wittaker trans., Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1994) (1989).
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The second argument concerns relational contracting. Where there is
an ongoing trading relationship, the parties must, in general, preserve the
expectation of continuity in order to protect their relation-specific investments. Furthermore, to meet the contingencies in this long-term
trading, contracts must afford the flexibility to revise provisions as necessary. Although this has previously been discussed, 9 the point here is on
how smoothly this contract revision occurs. In general, the market regulates contractual agreements while they are negotiated, when parties
have the freedom to withdraw. But when the parties discuss revisions
after they have entered into the contract, the same freedom of agreement
disciplined by the market does not exist. Parties who are bound by the
relationship must search for equitable terms. Even if they have mutual
interests in continuing the relationship, present disputes or differences in
expectations may give rise to a conflict of interest. In fact, the party who
has more invested in the relationship has less negotiating power, which
gives rise to opportunistic behavior by the other party. This is the major
reason why scholars in the United States are generally skeptical about
relational contracts.' °
Conversely, in Japan, contractual customs in accord with the relational contracting paradigm remain popular. This cannot be explained
solely on economic rationalist grounds. For these practices to thrive
there must be mechanisms which inhere in society and culture to contain
opportunism in contractual performance and revisions. On this point,
Hara's reinterpretation of Geertz's analysis of the traditional Indonesian
economy is informative; from an economics perspective Indonesian traditions have positive functions and were created not for the economy but
rather through social customs separate from economic activity. 4' While
the economic "formal postulate of rationality" (in other words, an assumption of homo economicus) only produces negative interactions,
non-economic social customs bring about "reciprocity equilibrium"-the
cooperative game in market transactions. From the perspective of this
39.
TAKASHI UCHIDA, KEIYAKU NO SAISEI [RESUSCITATION OF CONTRACTS] (1990).
40.
See Takao Tanase, Kankeiteki keiyakuron to hochitsujokan [Relational Contract
Theory and Views of Legal Order], in KEIYAKU HORI TO KEIYAKU KANKO [CONTRACTUAL
DOCTRINES AND PRACTICES] 1 (Takao Tanase ed., 1999) on the skepticism of U.S. contract law
scholars toward relational contracts.
41.
See YONOSUKE HARA, KURIFO-DO GIATSU NO KEIZAIGAKU [THE ECONOMICS OF
CLIFFORD GEERTZ] (1985).

42.
The debate between Suchman and Bernstein is interesting in that it indicates the
limits of economic analysis and explains the necessity of sociological analysis. See Mark C.
Suchman, Translation Costs: A Comment on Sociology and Economics, 74 OR. L. REV. 257
(1995). See also ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE
EMOTIONS (1988) (demonstrating, using game theory, that the collaboration required for human society cannot be explained by assumptions of rationality alone and that an elucidation of
the role of emotion is necessary).
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"socially-embedded economy," the revision of Japanese trade practices is
due more to the demise of cultural elements that once supported these
practices than to their inherent irrationality. Changes to the Japanese system, then, are less the result of the global market's demand for efficiency
and more reflective of the fact that many of the traditional cultural values
supporting the system are no longer seen as viable or no longer appeal to
the public's moral sense.43
Thus, even where the development of market-oriented laws is concerned, dictating in detail the rights and duties of economic entities and
striving for reliable enforcement of these obligations do not necessarily
lead to attaining efficiency. It is true that in some cases such reforms are
clearly necessary due to changes in industrial structure and global trends
in international finances. For China, modem laws constitute an infrastructure just as indispensable for accommodating industrialization as
the landscape-altering skyscrapers of its cities. The demand for regulation does not necessarily imply the kind of lifeless futuristic world that
appears in science fiction novels. Rather, it is rational, even in the economic sense, to create extralegal norms sustained by culture, to construct
bonds of reputation, and to suppress opportunistic behavior in the performance and renegotiation of contractual obligations. 44 In this sense, the
connection between legal and extralegal norms will continue to be the
subject of close scrutiny during the evolution of law in China.
IV. REFLECTIONS ON

MARKET-BASED PRINCIPLES

Criticisms of globalism, as byproducts of the market-oriented development of law, are pertinent to this discussion. This requires
consideration of three themes.
The first theme is the relationship between the rule of law and democracy. So far, commentators have analyzed the Chinese development
43.
A Japanese news article about a Taiwanese manufacturer stated: "Until the mid1990s we thought that we had no chance of winning over the group-conscious Japanese,
where company employees cooperate closely with one another out of a strong sense of belonging." The article diagnoses Japan as stuck between the old and the new. On the one hand,
the Japanese can no longer create this close teamwork, but on the other, even though individualism is strengthening, Japanese society is unable to create a system to capitalize on
individualism. Takashi Suzuki, Jiritsu mezasu kojin, gendoryoku [Individuals Striving for
Autonomy as Driving Force of Economy], NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Nov. 23, 2001, at 5.
44.
Winn analyzes the involvement of traditional economic structures in Taiwan's economic development, noting that despite the replacement of these structures with modem
institutions, distinctively Taiwanese organizational principles will continue to exist within the
modem economy. See Jane K. Winn, Relational Practices and the Marginalizationof Law:
Informal Financial Practices of Small Businesses in Taiwan, 28 LAW & Soc'Y. REv. 193

(1994).
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of law mainly in the context of economic development. The rule of law,
however, not only guarantees the freedom of economic activities but also
serves the important function of protecting the rights of individuals from
the improper exercise of state or social authority. Political freedom and
the right of democratic participation are also important. In China, demands for these liberties are growing stronger and can no longer be
ignored. Yet democracy has many faces and its own complications. With
regard to globalization, on one hand there are arguments claiming that
economic development is impossible without democracy; 45 in overseas
aid, the realization of democracy• is 46often made a condition or even a
purpose of developmental assistance. On the other hand, because of the
cross-border migration of workers and the relaxation of community ties
that accompany globalism, ethnic, religious, and cultural conflicts often
intensify into violent clashes, which in turn lead to acts of violent oppression. Here, globalism makes the transition to constitutional
democracy difficult.
There is also an inherent tension between the rule of law and democracy. The rule of law assumes the autonomy of law and the separation of
law from politics. Out of a concern for legitimacy, however, democratic
elements are often incorporated into the rule of law through citizen participation in the judiciary or by judges attempting to attune their
judgments to public opinion. In this regard, China is ahead of other
states in ensuring that judgments recognize and honor popular sentiment.
Indeed, the attainment of substantive justice unencumbered by procedural technicalities was a hallmark of justice in traditional China. Now,
with the new idea of procedural justice, we see signs of this approach
changing, but justice as defined by popular sentiment continues to dictate judgments in accordance with the emphasis in socialist ideology on
the welfare of the people. Political scientists may say there are conflicts
here between populism and constitutional democracy. In considering
these tensions and schisms, the Trinitarian development model of simultaneously attaining the rule of law, democracy, and a market economy
must be modified and refined to grasp the evolution of law in China.
The second theme concerns freedom and solidarity. In the European
criticism of globalism, there is a discernable trend of reaffirming the
45.

AMARTYA SEN, JIYU TO KEIZAI KAIHATSU [FREEDOM AND ECONOMIC DEVELOP-

ch. 6 (Masahiko Ishihara trans., 2000).
46.
See YASUTAMI SHIMOMURA, ET AL., ODA

TAIKO NO SEIJIKEIZAIGAKU [THE POLITI-

ODA] (1999)

(on the debate concerning development
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assistance). In Japan, the following mild statement appears in one of the four principles of
ODA: "Attention should be given to the promotion of democratization, efforts to introduce a
market-oriented economy and the guaranteeing of basic human rights and freedoms." Id. at
222.
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ideal of social democracy amidst the reign of the global market. States
around the world are cutting welfare budgets and reducing taxes and
other public levies so that business can meet the challenges of fierce
global competition.4'8 But the public does not uniformly support these
policies. A comparative survey in 199849 showed that when respondents
were asked whether they preferred "a competitive society appraising individual abilities" or "an egalitarian society with little income disparity,"
an overwhelming majority (68 percent) in the United States favored a
competitive society, with no more than 13 percent in favor of an egalitarian society. In France, however, 50 percent of respondents favored an
egalitarian society and 23 percent favored a competitive society. There is
a clear division here.
While this is a matter of national policy beyond the immediate technicalities of law, considering that the market-oriented development of
law is presently eroding the foundation of the Chinese socialist system
and bringing social frictions to the surface, it may be important for
China to reaffirm the value of solidarity, along with freedom, in its legal
reforms. The conscious efforts of the Chinese people and government
along this line may divert China's evolution of law from its projected
trajectory toward assimilating Western law.
The third theme is the discord between sovereignty and international
concerns. Although the logic of the free-market economy-"the market
stimulates efficient production, hence increasing overall wealth"-is
generally used to press global markets forward, there is obviously another viewpoint. Critical perspectives point to the uneven distribution of
wealth and deterioration in environment and labor conditions the massive
global market causes absent appropriate governance. 0 Furthermore, even
47.

See GUROBARUKA TO SEUI NO INOBE-SHON [GLOBALIZATION AND POLITICAL IN-

(Ikuo Takagi et al. eds., 2003). See especially the contributions by Thomas Meyer
and Jeff Faux.
On Japanese deregulation, see Osamu Watanabe, Shin jiyushugi senryaku toshite no
48.
shiho kaikaku, daigaku kaikaku [Reform of the Justice System and Universities as a NeoLiberalist Strategy], 72 HORITSU JIHO [LEGAL TIMES] 10 (2000). For a discussion including
Europe, see TOSHIHIRO MATOBA, GENDAI SEITO SHISUTEMU NO HENYO [CHANGE IN THE
MODERN POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEM] ch. 5 (2003).
Survey Done by Dentsu Communication Institute, Inc., ASAHI SHIMBUN, Sept. 5,
49.
1998.
Matsumoto distinguishes globalization and globalism, the latter being predicated on
50.
the former and defined as the doctrine of "taking a comprehensive approach to dealing with
global problems." Saburo Matsumoto, Kokusai seiji-tochi to kyosei no mosaku, in GOVERNANCE AND SYMBIOSIS, supra note 8, at 51. While the idea of global governance emerges from
this concept, Beck further emphasizes that "internal trends towards being cosmopolitan" also
occur within the nation state and within individuals as a new normative consciousness due to
this modem globalism. Ulrich Beck, Kosumoporitan shakai to sono teki [Cosmopolitan Society and Its Opponents], in GUROBURUKA TO SHAKAI HENDO [GLOBALISM AND SOCIAL
CHANGE] 13 (Mitsuo Ogura & Takamichi Kajita eds., 2002).
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developed states that benefit from and advance globalism always have
their national interests uppermost in their minds, as when they, from time
to time, push vigorously for the protection of their industries and agriculture in response to domestic political pressures. Naturally, various
international organizations and diplomatic efforts are attempting to ensure fair competition in the global market. But even the World Bank, a
champion of globalism, admits that the development of law is ultimately a
problem of the power and authority of the sovereign state and accepts that
a state cannot execute painful reforms and carry out efficient economic
management without political stability and a competent government bureaucracy.' In China's case, excellent economic performance supports the
legitimacy of the government's authority.52 For the moment, China maintains the good governance it needs to steer the economy and skillfully
manage the balance between sovereignty and international concerns.
Yet political awareness within China is changing rapidly. 3 As people
begin adopting pluralized values amidst prosperity, and as the strains of
high economic growth begin to emerge in the form of growing income
disparity and restless migrant workers in cities, there will no doubt be
objections against the government itself and its intense focus on economic development. Globalism is not a one-dimensional formation of a
market on the economic side; it also engenders a free market of ideas
and values with cross-border flows of information. This global interaction may create a new civil society in China, one in which people
evaluate their own government by global standards. 4 In contrast to economic interests, which brought more instances of collusion than
confrontation between sovereignty and foreign pressures (such as the
involvement of multinational corporations with dictatorial governments),
social concerns may begin mediating between national sovereignty and
international concerns to bring forth a new global community.
51.

See Julio Faundez, Introduction: Legal Technical Assistance, in GooD GOVERN-

MENT AND LAW: LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES I (Julio

Faundez ed., 1997).
52.
See Hong Pyo Lee, Chugoku ni okeru keizai kaikaku to seiji taisei henka no kanosei
[Economic Reform and Prospects for Democratization in China], 194 NAGOYA DAIGAKU
HOSEI RONSHU [NAGOYA U. J.L. & POL.] 37 (2002).
53.
Mori points out that because the diversification of interests has progressed in China
since its economic reforms, the future issue for the Chinese government will be to what extent
the political system will address and adjust these interests. Kazuko M6ri, Chugoku wa doko e
iku-kindaika e no mitsu no kadai [Whither China-Three Issues in Modernization], in GENDAI CHUGOKU NO KOZO HENDO [STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN MODERN CHINA] 269 (2000).
54.
See Hiromichi Imai, Gendai ni okeru seiji no datsukokkaka to kindai no kokufuku
[Modem Political De-statizationand Conquest of Modernity], 53 HOKUDAI HOGAKU RONSHU
[HOKKAIDO U. L. REV.] 790 (2002). Imai seeks the possibility of a new civil society in Asia
amidst the emergence of social movements with a diversity of cross-border alliances and visions.
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While the rule of law, the guarantee of freedom, and transnational
universal law are inevitable ingredients of legal reform in the global
market, I have indicated that some reservations are necessary for these
three components. Most of the discourse on China's development of law
views it as the implementation of Western law, particularly the very
modernist understanding of that law. Yet, informed by modem critical
theory, we in modem states view our law in a much more complicated
manner. This critical reflection is a direct result of the breadth of tasks
that the law today must undertake, which cannot be reduced to the guaranteeing of freedom and human rights through the application of
universal law.55 When looking at the relationship between economic
growth and law in detail, even the achievement of efficiency is not a
simple matter, given the transaction costs. If the stability of society becomes yet another goal, even more complications will arise.
Furthermore, at times law conspires, consciously or unconsciously, with
the dominant order and can give birth to oppression. By bringing a critical perspective to the study of China, we not only grasp more accurately
the evolution of Chinese law, but we also learn from it a possible alternative development of law within contemporary global society.

55.
Darian-Smith reviews the literature on the evolution of law under contemporary
globalism and advocates a closer look at how the new norms of the global market and universal human rights relate to the lives of people. She suggests that oppression, resistance, and the
emergence of rival norms deserve careful analysis. See Eve Darian-Smith, Structural Inequalities in the GlobalLegal System, 34 L. & Soc'Y REV. 809 (2000).

